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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (5 Mar 70) FOR OT-UT-694325

12 March 1970

SUBJECT. ~~Operational Reports~~ Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Infantry  
Division Artillery, ~~Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)~~


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be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days  
of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate  
benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and  
may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

  
ROBERT E. LYNCH  
Colonel, AGC  
Acting The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division Artillery  
APO 96345

AVDB-RA

19 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division Artillery for Period  
Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR - 65 (U)

Commanding General  
1st Infantry Division  
ATTN: AVDB-TT (MHD)  
APO US Forces 96345

## 1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities

a. The 1st Infantry Division Artillery continued to support AO Redball and combined operations Toan Thang III, Operation Strangle and Danger Forward (Phase 2). Artillery support for these operations continued to be characterized by changes in the artillery organization for combat (Inclosure 1) and frequent tactical moves of artillery units (Inclosure 2). Division Artillery provided follow-up fires for B-52 strikes; fired counter mortar/rocket programs in the defense of Lai Khe (XT7838), Dau Tieng (XT4947), and Cu Chi (XT6212); and supported ARVN operations in the Ben Cat District.

b. 1st Infantry Division Artillery operations were conducted in accordance with the Division Artillery Field SOP. Significant activities and procedures are noted below:

(1) Artillery organization for combat was dictated by the operational areas of the maneuver elements. Normally, each maneuver battalion was supported by at least one 105mm howitzer battery. General support reinforcing missions were assigned individual medium and heavy batteries to assist the direct support battalions in providing fires for airmobile assault preparations, ground operations, and counter mortar/rocket suppression fires for three major base camps within the Division TAOR.

(2) Seventy-three firing unit moves (57 overland and 16 rotary wing) were conducted during this period.

(3) The fires of four ARVN 105mm howitzers were integrated with six US 105mm howitzers, providing both HE and illumination in support of ground operations, during the seal of Phu Hoa Dong village (XT7219), 15-26 Sep 69. A new concept employing searchlights in offensive operations received its first test during the seal. A 20 foot airmobile tower equipped with a searchlight bolted to the platform and armed with a M60 machinegun and a

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Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CS for - 65 (U)

.50 caliber machinegun was co-located with a Division PPS-5 radar section in a Regional Force/Popular Force compound. The searchlight and radar were invaluable in locating the enemy during the hours of darkness and contributed significantly to the success of the seal.

### 2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel: None

b. Operations:

(1) Employment of 8" SP Howitzers (M110) at a fire support base (FSB):

(a) Observation: Emplacement of the M110 on unprepared ground during the rainy season is not practical as constant shifting of the track and spade tears up the ground after a very short period of time.

(b) Evaluation: The M110 cannot be employed on a semi-permanent basis without preparation of firing pads which provide solid foundation for the tracks, firm emplacement of the spade and proper drainage. It is not necessary to prepare firing pads when the primary azimuth of fire is not changed or the track remains in position for only one or two days.

(c) Recommendation: That firing pads of literite fill or crushed rock, as a minimum, be constructed whenever the M110 will occupy a position for more than one or two days.

(2) Closing Fire Support Bases:

(a) Observation: Dismantling howitzer positions constructed with metal cannisters and wooden beams is time-consuming and requires additional transportation resources.

(b) Evaluation: Artillery positions should be constructed with a minimum of permanent type structures.

(c) Recommendations:

1 That parapets be constructed with MSA1 steel planking and sandbags to minimize dismantling time and assets necessary to move a battery.

2 That POL areas, generators and tents be revetted with dirt filled ammo boxes on the outside and one wall of sandbags on the inside to minimize wood splintering.

3 That empty ammo containers be regularly transported out of FSB's to expedite future displacements.

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### (3) Registration Plans:

(a) Observation: Use of a registration plan makes efficient use of the AN/MPQ-4A radar and frees aerial observers for other important duties.

(b) Evaluation: A registration plan that uses permanent registration points and surveyed OP's to conduct HB/MPI registrations provides the following advantages:

1 HB registration provides fuse corrections.

2 Registration data derived from HB registrations are more accurate than data derived from a precision registration conducted by an AO when the registration point is not surveyed.

3 A minimum amount of AO time is spent on registrations, freeing the AO for visual reconnaissance and other priority missions.

4 OP's provide a flash base for target acquisition means.

(NOTE: In selecting registration points, MET checkpoint ranges should be used since MET + VE GFT settings and wind cards are more accurate when the maximum ordinate of the trajectory approaches the altitude of a met line number).

(c) Recommendation: That HB/MPI registration plans be implemented at the battalion level when possible.

### (4) Employment of Artillery on Radar Sightings:

(a) Observation: Recent tracking of enemy movement by AN/TPS-25 and PPS-5 Ground Surveillance Radars revealed that the target disappeared from the scope as soon as the artillery was fired. After completion of firing, the target reappeared on the scope as personnel running.

(b) Evaluation: Enemy personnel apparently hit the ground as soon as the artillery firing is heard and depart the area immediately upon termination of firing.

(c) Recommendation: That radar sightings be engaged with a minimum of two battery volleys - the second volley being fired on command as soon as the target reappears.

### (5) Engagement of Sensor Developed Targets:

(a) Observation: Targets developed by unattended ground sensor devices are usually fleeting in nature and require rapid artillery response.

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(b) Evaluation: Personnel activating a sensor are normally in an upright position and seek protection when fired upon by artillery.

(c) Recommendations:

1 That sensor developed targets in open terrain be attacked initially with PD fuze followed by volleys with VT fuze.

2 That sensor developed targets in wooded terrain be attacked with PD or fuze delay.

3 That sensor developed targets be engaged with battery one round volley on the sensor location, one volley 200 meters left and right, and one volley 200 meters over and short (total of 30 rds).

4 That Improved Conventional Munitions be used in lieu of fuze PD for initial rounds in open terrain when troop safety permits.

(6) Target Destruction Section:

(a) Observation: A more efficient method to correlate the Division's intelligence and response assets was needed. Small unit contacts, sensor activations, SLAR, SPAR, Red Haze and Bloodhound reports were not followed up systematically. Accordingly, a Target Destruction Section (TDS) was formed using existing assets from Division Artillery S-2, the Division Fire Support Element, the Military Intelligence Detachment and the Sensor Platoon. The TDS is located in the Division Tactical Operations Center and is supervised by the Assistant Fire Support Coordinator.

(b) Evaluation: The Target Destruction Section monitors and analyses all current intelligence affecting the TAOI and recommends an appropriate response to G-3 Operations. The TDS receives spot reports from G-3, G-2, G-5 (e.g. Chieu Hoi reports), G-2 Air (visual reconnaissance, SLAR, SPAR, Red Haze, Bloodhound reports), radar sightings and sensor activations. Based on the analysis, the TDS recommends the most appropriate weapon to engage the target.

(c) Recommendation: That one section be solely responsible for analyzing all current intelligence from Division sources and recommending appropriate means of engagement.

(7) Transporting FADAC:

(a) Observation: Transporting FADAC overland frequently causes damage to the FADAC.

(b) Evaluation: The memory unit in the FADAC is susceptible to damage from jarring and bumping during tactical overland movements. This headquarters has found that the FADAC is more likely to arrive intact if moved by rotary wing aircraft.

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(c) Recommendation: That FADAC be moved by rotary wing aircraft when possible. If moved overland, the reusable FADAC container or a suitable cushioning device should be used.


(8) Movement of M102 Howitzer:

(a) Observation: Batteries equipped with the M102 howitzer have experienced difficulties when conducting extensive ground movement over unimproved roads.

(b) Evaluation: In a recent overland move, several M102 howitzers experienced damage to sight mounts, quadrant mechanisms, and wheel bearing failure due to the poor road conditions.

(c) Recommendation: M102 howitzers be moved by rotary wing aircraft whenever possible.

- c. Training: None
- d. Intelligence: None
- e. Logistics: None
- f. Organization: None
- g. Other: None



JOHN P. KEAN  
Colonel, FA  
Commanding

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as

Incls 1 and 2 wd HQ, DA

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AVDB-T-AMD (19 Nov 69) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned For the Period 1 August  
1969 - 31 October 1969, 1st Infantry Division Artillery (1st  
CSFOR -65)(U)

DA, HQ, 1st Infantry Division, APO 96345 7 DEC 1969

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: 7th AB, APO  
96266

1. (U) The 1st Infantry Division Artillery Operational Report - Lessons Learned has been reviewed and approved by this headquarters.
2. (U) This report is forwarded in compliance with USARV Reg 125-1.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
NEIL CARSRUD  
1LT, AGC  
ASST AG

AVFBC-RE-H (19 Nov 69) 2nd Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division Artillery for Period  
Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR - 65 (U)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 1 Nov 1969

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report -  
Lessons Learned of the 1st Infantry Division Artillery for the period  
ending 31 October 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
B. G. McDONALD  
LTJG AGC  
Asst AG

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AVHGC-DST (19 Nov 69) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division Artillery for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division Artillery and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (C) Reference item concerning "Closing Fire Support Bases", page 2, paragraph 2b(2); concur. The first consideration is to do all that is required to accomplish the mission. The improvements, necessities, gun pits, and hardening of the position area will be dictated by the situation and material available.

b. (C) Reference item concerning "Employment of Artillery on Radar Sightings", page 3, paragraph 2b(4); concur. However, the commander will establish his criteria for attacking a target. The principles of target analysis and attack are contained in Chapter 27, FM 6-40. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

c. (C) Reference item concerning "Engagement of Sensor Developed Targets" page 3, paragraph 2b(5). The recommendation appears sound, however, the commander's guidance, availability of ammunition, higher headquarters' rules of engagement and commanders' desired results should be taken into consideration when engaging sensor developed targets.

d. (C) Reference item concerning "Target Destruction Section", page 4, paragraph 2b(6); concur. The Target Destruction Section provides a capability for the rapid conversion of incoming information to targets which allows for a quick response with available combat power. This article has been extracted for inclusion in the 1 January 1970 Combat Intelligence Lessons (CIL).

e. (U) Reference item concerning "Movement of M102 Howitzer", page 5, paragraph 2b(8); concur. However, damage to the fire control hardware of the M102 105mm Howitzer has been a constant problem when moving the weapon over unimproved roads and when improperly slung during movement by air. USARVCOM has been informed of the problem and selective fire control hardware has been internally redesigned to improve the gear train. To date, 160 of the modified items have been released to the field through the Closed Loop Supply Program. These items should improve the operational readiness for


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**AVEGOC-DST (19 Nov 69) 3d Ind**

**SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division Artillery for Period  
Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)**

the M102. Ten sets of completely modified fire control hardware are presently due for a 60-day field test prior to further production of a new fire control unit. These sets will also include the quick removal mounts. The above information has been relayed to the submitting unit.

**FOR THE COMMANDER:**



**Cy Furn:  
1st Inf Div Arty  
II FFORCEV**

GPOP-DT (19 Nov 69) 4th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Infantry Division Artillery for  
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 8 FEB 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



C. L. SHORTT  
CPT, AGC  
Ass AG

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